Return of IAEA inspectors to Iran and escalating threat of sanctions.

Arab Sea Newspaper - Special

Return of IAEA Inspectors to Iran and Escalation of Sanctions Threat Detailed Strategic Analysis — "Bahr Al Arab" Newspaper Introduction (News in Two Lines) In late August 2025, a team of IAEA inspectors returned to Iran for the first time since the suspension of cooperation following the strikes on its nuclear facilities in June. However, Tehran described this presence as limited and not a full resumption of cooperation. In contrast, the European Troika (Britain, France, Germany) announced that they are ready to initiate the mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions ("snapback") if effective evidence of regular monitoring and a return to a clear negotiating path do not materialize. First: Basic Facts — A Brief Sequence of Events • In June 2025, some nuclear sites inside Iran were attacked (Israel is the prime suspect in carrying them out). • After these attacks, the Iranian Parliament issued a resolution, and the Iranian Presidency approved an official law, stipulating the suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Conclusion: External attack on nuclear sites → political and legal response from Tehran → suspension of cooperation with the IAEA. • In its May 2025 report, the Agency confirmed that Iran possesses large stockpiles of enriched uranium, reaching a level of 60%. • This percentage is very high, because the uranium used to operate peaceful reactors is usually much lower (3–5%). • The existence of a stockpile at this level means that Iran is technically closer to producing uranium enriched to 90%, which is the percentage required to manufacture a nuclear weapon. • For this reason, international concern has increased regarding a matter called "Breakout Time," i.e., the time period Iran needs if it decides to raise enrichment from 60% to 90% and convert it into material suitable for making a nuclear weapon. Conclusion: The Agency's report in May 2025 stated that Iran possesses quantities and enrichment levels that make it very close to military nuclear capability, which worried the international community and opened the door to new pressures and sanctions. • On August 26–27, 2025, Tehran allowed the return of a team of IAEA inspectors, but within the framework of temporary and limited arrangements, limited, for example, to monitoring the process of replacing fuel at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Iranian authorities confirmed that this step does not mean a return to full cooperation with the Agency, but rather there will be new frameworks for dealing that will be determined according to its conditions. In contrast, the European Troika (France, Germany, Britain) escalated its diplomatic pressure, threatening to activate the mechanism for restoring international sanctions (snapback) if Iran does not provide serious guarantees regarding its nuclear activities. Second: The Secrets — What is Not Said Explicitly but Affects the Course of the Crisis 1. Internal conflict over the form of the relationship with the Agency: The Parliament's decision and the suspension law placed the legislative and security authorities in control of any cooperation decision. But the state apparatus (Foreign Ministry, Atomic Energy Organization) seeks to achieve a balance between practical need (operating stations/fuel) and maintaining "sovereign pride." This balance explains allowing only a limited visit. 2. Calculations of deterrence and external response: The European proposal to activate the "snapback" mechanism is nothing but an attempt to intensify political and economic pressure on Tehran to open a negotiating window before sliding into a wider confrontation; European countries are betting that the threat of sanctions will bring Iran back to the negotiating table without a direct military opening. 3. Iran's negotiating power based on energy and time: Part of Tehran's strategy is to invest its stockpile of enriched materials (and the possibility of accelerating enrichment) as a negotiating card — i.e., "I will restore cooperation under political conditions in exchange for guarantees against attacks and preventing the imposition of economically crippling sanctions." 4. Neutralizing the Agency from political targeting: The head of the Agency faced increasing threats and was forced to take personal protection measures, which reflects the political pressures that hinder the Agency's work and make its technical role vulnerable to political blackmail. Third: The Nuclear Reality: What Technical Reports Tell Us (and the Value of Risks) . The IAEA report GOV/2025/24, issued on May 17, 2025, showed that Iran now possesses about 9.2 tons of uranium enriched to various levels, including hundreds of kilograms reaching a level of 60%. This figure reflects a qualitative leap in the size and quality of nuclear stockpiles, and redraws the equation of what is known as the "technical time for nuclear breakout," i.e., the time period Tehran needs if it decides to raise enrichment to a level of 90% and convert it into material suitable for producing a nuclear weapon. Strategic Analysis Iran's possession of a stockpile of up to 9.2 tons of enriched uranium, including hundreds of kilograms at 60%, represents a sensitive turning point in the regional balance of power. This amount of material, even if it is not yet at the military level of 90%, dangerously shortens what is called the "nuclear breakout time," i.e., the time required to move from high enrichment to the production of weapon-grade material. Compared to previous years, when the Iranian stockpile did not exceed a few tons at low enrichment levels (3.5%–20%), the current situation puts Iran closer than ever to the nuclear threshold. This shift gives Tehran a strategic deterrent card in the face of its regional rivals — foremost among them Israel, which possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal — and enhances its negotiating power in the face of the West. But in contrast, this accumulation raises the level of concern among Western capitals, which fear that the stockpile will be translated into a quick political decision to convert it into a weapon, which may push Europe and the United States to accelerate the sanctions track, and perhaps even turn a blind eye to preemptive military operations led by Israel to obstruct this progress. • Independent technical analyses (such as reports from expert centers) indicate that the presence of quantities of highly enriched material greatly reduces the time to produce "weaponizable" material — which is why the West is pressing for the restoration of continuous and facilitated monitoring. Fourth: The Event in the Balance of Strategy — Who Holds the Initiative Card? • Tehran: Possesses increasing technical capabilities (stockpiles and development of centrifuges) and a time card; but it faces economic and diplomatic pressure that limits its room for maneuver. Its current strategy is a combination of: enhancing capabilities, maintaining sovereignty of decision-making, and opening conditional negotiating corridors. • Europe (the Troika): Uses a legal punitive mechanism to exert pressure without immediately resorting to the use of force; the success of this strategy depends on its ability to garner broad international support and on not clashing with Russia and China in the Security Council. The United States and Israel: Parallel Strategies and Divergent Paths – The United States: Washington deals with the Iranian file as a multi-dimensional crisis: nuclear, regional, and economic. Therefore, American policy tends to manage the crisis instead of detonating it, by combining: • Active diplomacy: Reopening channels with the IAEA and with European allies, with the aim of imposing at least partial monitoring, preventing Tehran from reaching the nuclear threshold. • Gradual economic pressure: Keeping sanctions as a main weapon to be used in escalation or mitigation according to Iran's behavior. • The reserve military option: Remains present but not preferred, as Washington realizes that a wide strike could ignite the region and harm global energy markets, especially in an election year or a sensitive economic situation. In other words, the United States adopts the doctrine of the stick and the carrot: open conditional negotiation, countered by a silent threat to use force if the roads are blocked. – Israel: Unlike Washington, Tel Aviv believes that any Iranian approach to the 90% enrichment level represents a direct existential threat, and therefore cannot be dealt with by slow diplomatic mechanisms. Therefore, Israel tends to: • Preventive options: Covert or overt operations targeting nuclear facilities, as has happened repeatedly since 2010 until June 2025. • Narrowing the breakout window: Through limited strikes that disrupt and delay the Iranian program, even if this leads to limited regional confrontations. • Pressuring allies: Urging the United States and Europe to take more stringent positions, including accelerating the sanctions mechanism or approving security guarantees for Israel. In this sense, the Israeli approach is "directly tactical" while the American approach is "strategically long-term." The Result: The difference between the two paths does not mean contradiction, but rather reflects an implicit division of roles: Washington holds the file as a major power seeking to manage the global balance, while keeping Israel's hand free to launch localized strikes that give international pressure "deterrent credibility." In the end, Iran finds itself between a double pincer: economic and political pressures led by Washington and its allies, and military operational pressures represented by Israel, with regional parties realizing that any imbalance in this equilibrium will immediately affect energy security and supply lines in the Gulf and the Middle East. Fifth: Possible Scenarios (Three Practical Models) The Best Scenario — Organized Negotiating Calm • Europe hesitates to activate the snapback after recording practical steps from Iran (extending inspectors' access, transparency in the uranium stockpile, and starting bilateral talks), and channels are opened to ensure that facilities are not targeted during negotiations. The Result: Reduced risks of military slippage and a window to manage a long-term crisis. (Reference: European diplomatic statements and a desire to avoid confrontation). The Likely Scenario — Mutual Pressure with Threat of Sanctions • Europeans launch a formal mechanism for pressure